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Abstract
Game-theoretical approach to the analysis of parallel algorithms
is proposed. The approach is based on presentation of the parallel
computing as a congestion game. In the game processes compete for
resources such as core of a central processing unit and a communication
subsystem. There are players, resources and payoffs (time delays) of
players which depend on resources usage. Comparative analysis of
various optimality principles in the proposed model may be performed.
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1 Introduction
Development of optimal control methods is of great importance for differ-
ent problems, see for example [1], [2] and [3]. One of actual such problems
is high-performance computing which is complex problem including both
hardware (see for example [4]) and software[5]. Execution of parallel appli-
cations may be considered as complex interaction of few components. First
one is set of parallel programs queued on high-performance computing clus-
ter. Each parallel application is constituted of processes with communica-
tions between them. Second component is parallel computing system which
consists of computing nodes and communication subsystem. A computing
node provides central processor and memory to executing programs. Main
component of the software environment is operating system with scheduler
which orchestrates set of processes placed on the node. Due to limited hard-
ware resources parallel computing may be considered as a competition of a
set of processes for resources. Such competition should not decrease overall
efficiency of the whole system so search of optimum and analysis of various
∗o.malafeev@spbu.ru
†s.nemnyugin@spbu.ru
1
optimality principles is of significant importance for the control of parallel
computations.
We propose game-theoretical approach to the analysis of parallel algo-
rithms. Shortly it may be formulated as follows. There are players (pro-
cesses), resources and payoffs (time delays) of players which depend on how
much of a resource is used by processes placed on the computing node. It
is the case of congestion or, more general, potential game[6]. Results of
congestion games theory was used in consideration of networking problems
[7]. Congestion game theory results may be used to derive some conclu-
sions about efficient structure of parallel algorithms and their dispatching
on parallel computing systems.
2 Model of parallel computing
Algorithm of a parallel application process may be presented by directed
acyclic graph (DAG) [8]. In the article we will refer to the DAG as infor-
mation graph of an algorithm. Nodes of an information graph are macroop-
erations. The macrooperation transforms input data into output and send
result to next macrooperation or a final result to the user. Links present
data transactions between macrooperations. We consider case when only
one source s (data input) and only one sink t (data output) are associated
with any information graph: PG = (V,L), s, t ∈ V . Here V is set of nodes
of the graph and L is set of directed links.
At first let us consider case of sequential program. Its graph is given, for
example, by upper half of the graph in Fig. 1. Here s ≡ A is source which
receives input data and t ≡ D is sink which performs output operations of
the resulting data. In the graph two branches exist: ABC and ACD. Both
branches correspond to execution of the same sequential program on two
different computing nodes. If the target computing system is symmetrical
this two cases are equivalent. In the case of asymmterical system the branch
is preferrable which corresponds to execution on the node with higher per-
formance.
One of the most important metrics of a parallel application is its total
time of execution which may be defined as maximum of execution times
over all processes. Now let us suppose that Fig. 1 is information graph of
the algorithm which is almost ideally parallel and macrooperations B and
C have equal computational complexities. Again let us consider the case of
symmetrical target computing system. Here optimum in time of execution
has place when data flow from A is divided into two equal parts. It is Nash
equilibrium because if one player, for example, corresponding to the branch
ACD tries to improve time of its own execution by decreasing amount of
data then the second player (ABC) have to process greater amount of data.
Overall performance in this case will be less then in equilibrium. In general,
2
the Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies in a non-cooperative game when
each player knows the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no
player can’t get additional benefit by changing only its own strategy. In
general Nash equilibrium doesn’t guarantee best performance.
Figure 1: Information graph of sequential or simple parallel algorithm
Next let us consider information graph (Fig. 2). It is the classical sim-
plest example where the Braess paradox may take place [9]. Now three paths
of execution there are exist: ABD, ACD and ABCD. In this case BD and
BCD may be placed onto different computing nodes.
In the model we propose in the article influence of other processes placed
on computing nodes have to be taken into account. Due to competition for
limited resources the more is the load of the node the more is time of execu-
tion of the process. It is the case of a congestion game. Generally, software
developer takes care for minimization of time of execution of every branch of
a parallel algorithm. In game-theoretical language it may be interpreted as
selfish behaviour of players. A congestion game is CG = (G, (s, t), (fe)e∈L),
where fe is nonnegative, continuous and nondecreasing latency function and
G is graph of an algorithm. Latency function describes slowing down of
process execution due to dependence of the time of computation on the
data volume and possibly from other factors. In more general case in la-
tency function may be included accounting of the competition of different
processes for limited resources. Total latency function is alsow defined as
follows: LFtot(x) =
∑
e∈Φ
fe(x), where Φ is a set of links in the path of exe-
cution for the given parallel algorithm. LFtot(x) may be taken as a criteria
of optimization.
In the model described existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
should be studied. The case with large amount of data or players may be
approximated by the game with infinite number of players. Analogue of
Nash equilibrium in the game with infinite number of players is Wardrope’s
equilibrium [9].
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Figure 2: Information graph of parallel algorithm
3 Conclusion
In the article game-theoretical approach to the analysis of efficiency of par-
allel algorithms is proposed. It is assumed that parallel computing may
be considered as congestion game with finite or infinite number of players.
Principles of optimality may be formulated for such game and different kinds
of equilibrium should be studied. It is the topic of further study.
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